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    Building your own online dating website is a great way to earn an extra income online. Unobtrusive communication can eventually develop into something more serious. My earliest memory of her was as the host of The 5th Wheel, part of the block of unintentionally comedic reality dating shows that used to air in the early aughts. Continued “There was this super hot guy in my class who, by the way, was Sam Rockwell.

    06 nash equilibrium dating and cournot mov Chat with hot girls on a webcam free no sign up

    Putting.other.people's.shoes-RMVB[(105346)10-54-51]. Putting.other.people's.shoes-RMVB[(005006)10-54-07].

    Ben Polak教授任职于耶鲁大学管理学院经济系。他在剑桥大学Trinity College获得学士学位,在西北大学获得硕士学位,在哈佛大学获得博士学位。他是微观经济理论和经济史方面的专家。他的论文在Economic Letters、Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of Economic History、Journal of Legal Studies、 Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics、Econometrica等学术期刊多次发表。他最近的研究是“广义功利主义和海萨尼的公正观察员定理”和“平均分散的偏好”课程结构:本耶鲁大学课程每周在学校上两次课,每次75分钟,2007年秋季拍摄作为耶鲁大学开放课程之一。课程视频截图:课程安排:1 Introduction: five first lessons 简介:五年前的教训2 Putting yourselves into other people's shoes 设身处地为他人着想3 Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem 迭代删除和位数选民定理4 Best responses in soccer and business partnerships 最佳反应在足球和商业伙伴关系5 Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs 纳什均衡:坏时尚及银行挤兑6 Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot 什均衡:约会和诺7 Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line 纳什均衡:购物,并参加表决的常委会上线8 Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization 纳什均衡:定位,隔离和随机9 Mixed strategies in theory and tennis 混合战略的理论和网球10 Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes 混合战略棒球,约会和支付您的税11 Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium 进化稳定:合作,突变,与平衡12 Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles 进化稳定:社会公约,侵略,和周期13 Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions 顺序游戏:道德风险,奖励和饥饿的狮子14 Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages 落后的感应:承诺,间谍,和先行者优势15 Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats 落后的感应:国际象棋,战略和可信的威胁16 Backward induction: reputation and duels 落后的感应:声誉和决斗17 Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining 落后的感应:最后通牒和讨价还价18 Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection 不完全信息:信息集和子博弈完美19 Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments 子博弈完美均衡:招商引资和战略投资20 Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition 子博弈完美均衡:战争的消耗21 Repeated games: cooperation vs.

    We use two ideas from earlier lectures, dominance and backward induction, to analyze the game.

    Finally we discuss two biases found in Americans: overconfidence and over-valuing being pro-active.

    So if we are sitting, if we are sitting in state 1, can any of the participants change their strategy-- can gain by changing their strategy, assuming the other participant is constant?

    The different players have different strategies, and based on their interacting strategies, you end up in different states. And here's a definition of Nash equilibrium from Princeton.

    And that's a good place to get the definition, because that's where John Nash spent a good bit of his career.

    We discuss how to build the idea of reputation into game theory; in particular, in setting like this where a threat or promise would otherwise not be credible.

    The key idea is that players may not be completely certain about other players' payoffs or even their rationality.

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